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RACING ON TWO DIFFERENT 
TRACKS: USING SUBSTANTIVE 
DUE PROCESS TO CHALLENGE 





When I first started teaching at Charlottesville High School 
(CHS), it was like teaching at two schools: half the day I spent 
teaching honors classes composed of mostly white students from 
highly educated, well-to-do families, and the rest of the day I spent 
teaching non-honors classes where most students were young people 
of color from poor families. Because there was only one high school 
serving Charlottesville, Virginia, a small but highly diverse city1 in the 
Shenandoah Mountains, the school contained many students from 
different ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds. Despite the 
impressive diversity, segregation was pervasive since students worked 
and socialized solely with others in their own academic tracks. Like 
many other schools across the country with similar make-up and 
structure, all one had to do was peer through the doorway of any 
classroom in the hallway and observe the racial demographics to 
discern whether the class was on a non-honors or honors track. 
Tracking is a practice where schools divide students into different 
categories based on their previous achievements or potential for 
learning.2 Tracking produces different levels of classes, from low 
 
Copyright © 2018 Katarina Wong. 
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 1.  Charlottesville has a majority minority student population, and twenty-five percent of 
the students are identified as belonging to some race other than white or black. Fifteen percent 
of the students speak English as a second language. Fast Facts, CHARLOTTESVILLE CITY SCH., 
http://charlottesvilleschools.org/home/about-ccs/fast-facts/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2017). 
 2.  JEANNIE OAKES, KEEPING TRACK 3 (2d ed. 2005). 
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ability to high ability, based on the theory that students learn better 
when grouped with others at their own level.3 However, tracking is 
problematic because it disproportionately divides students by race.4 
Low-tracked classes often fail to provide the same wealth of learning 
opportunities for learning as high-tracked classes.5 As a result, 
students of color and low socioeconomic status do not receive the 
same educational benefits as white and/or wealthier students.6  
Tracking also limits student mobility between tracks, stigmatizes 
students in low tracks, distributes resources inequitably,7 and hinders 
integration by eliminating opportunities for students to interact with 
people from different backgrounds. 
In 2012, English teachers at CHS piloted an “unleveled” program 
for students in ninth and tenth grade8 to respond to the negative 
effects of tracking. Although CHS already had non-honors and honors 
courses in English, the unleveled course offered students the 
opportunity to take a class with others who might not be in the same 
academic track in a traditional model. The unleveled English course 
centered its inquiry on pursuing “essential questions,” thematic 
questions that were designed to draw in students of many different 
backgrounds so they could contribute based on their unique 
experiences.9 The teachers in the unleveled program pushed their 
students to work at an honors level, but also differentiated10 all 
discussions and assignments.11 Notably, the course allowed students to 
opt in to completing additional coursework to earn honors credit; this 
allowed students to take this diverse and differentiated unleveled 
class and still put “honors” on their transcripts. 
 
 3.  Id. at 4. 
 4.  Id. at 175. 
 5.  Id. at 236. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Kevin G. Welner & Jeannie Oakes, (Li)Ability Grouping: The New Susceptibility of 
School Tracking Systems to Legal Challenges, 66 HARV. EDUC. REV. 451, 453 (1996). 
 8.  CHS Teachers Seeing Success with “Unleveling” Classes, NBC29 (Feb. 23, 2015), 
http://www.nbc29.com/story/28065673/chs-teachers-seeing-success-with-unleveling-classes. 
 9.  Tim Shea, Charlottesville High School tests new instructional model, 
CHARLOTTESVILLE TOMORROW (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.cvilletomorrow.org/news/ 
article/20129-unleveled-english/. A sample essential question is “How should people of different 
cultures interact with one another?” In response, students would bring in different texts and 
personal experiences to answer this question throughout a unit. 
 10.  Teachers differentiated curriculum by modifying content, tasks, lessons, and 
assignments to meet different student needs. 
 11.  CHS Teachers Seeing Success with “Unleveling” Classes, supra note 8. 
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The teachers and administrators at CHS knew that the unleveled 
course could not coexist forever with the honors and non-honors 
courses: if CHS was going to truly commit to an instructional model 
that would bring its diverse community of students together, the 
unleveled course would have to replace the others. Teachers and 
administrators took on two major responsibilities: (1) creating an 
effective unleveled class that would truly fit students of different 
cultural backgrounds and academic abilities, and (2) convincing the 
families that the unleveled program would work for all students. 
Through school board meetings, hearings, open houses, and individual 
conversations, CHS staff were constantly marketing the unleveled 
program: as teachers, we spoke about the academic merits of the class 
in addition to the social benefits of a rich learning environment where 
students could learn from each other’s unique backgrounds. By 2017, 
CHS had eliminated its ninth and tenth grade English honors classes 
and replaced them with the unleveled “Honors Option” classes,12 and 
had already begun piloting the program in other subject areas like 
history and science. A segregated school with a complicated racial 
history was taking successful steps in integrating students. 
But not all students have the luxury of waiting for their schools to 
make voluntary efforts to desegregate their classrooms. These tracking 
systems perpetuate racial stereotypes and inequalities in 
heterogeneous schools through its seemingly neutral sorting until 
parents and students challenge their schools. 
Because tracking practices surged as a means of resegregating 
students in integrated schools after Brown v. Board of Education,13 
plaintiffs began to file suit against their districts, claiming a violation 
of their equal protection rights.14 The legal framework used to 
challenge tracking has closely mirrored the developments in the 
braoder equal protection analysis since Brown; it has been limited by 
cases such as Washington v. Davis15 and Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.16 Equal protection 
 
 12.  Minutes School Board Meeting, CHARLOTTESVILLE CITY SCH. (Dec. 1, 2016), 
http://esbpublic.ccs.k12.va.us/attachments/253252fa-6785-4b34-84d2-53c8e518d10c.pdf. 
 13.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 14.  See, e.g., Lemon v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971); Moses v. 
Washington Par. Sch. Bd., 330 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. La. 1971), aff’d, 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 
1972); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). 
 15.  426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that a state action’s disproportionate impact alone 
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
 16.  551 U.S. 701, 730 (2007) (rejecting racial balancing as a compelling state interest to 
justify the use of racial classifications). 
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doctrine has thus become an ineffective tool with limited success in 
attacking the discriminatory effects of tracking: the courts’ repeated 
emphasis on finding past or present intentional discrimination 
ultimately precludes a remedy for students of color in many school 
districts. 
Although the Equal Protection clause does not provide much 
relief for students in schools without a history of intentional 
discriminatory practices,17 the Due Process Clause could provide 
another strategy to challenge tracking. The Due Process Clause 
protects substantive rights, including those enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights and other fundamental rights the Supreme Court finds rooted 
in “history and tradition.”18 Though the Supreme Court has rejected a 
fundamental right to education,19 it has left the door open for the 
possibility of a fundamental right to a minimally adequate education 
or some basic level of education.20 Alternatively, many states have 
recognized both a fundamental right to education or a fundamental 
right to a minimally adequate education.21 According to the standards 
that currently govern the doctrine for a minimally adequate 
education, social science evidence focused on tracking’s impacts 
shows that this educational practice likely violates that right.22 
Challenging tracking in states that recognize such rights under a 
substantive due process claim may provide a more effective litigation 
strategy for plaintiffs who require a court mandate. 
 
 17.  See infra Part II. 
 18.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). 
 19.  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33–35 (1973). 
 20.  See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982) ( “[As] . . . pointed out early in our 
history, . . . some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively 
and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence.”) 
(quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)). 
 21.  See, e.g., Meyers v. Bd. of Educ. of San Juan Sch. Dist., 905 F. Supp. 1544 (D. Utah 
1995) (recognizing a right to education in the Utah Constitution); Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 
88, 90 (1973) (recognizing a fundamental right to education under the Arizona Constitution); 
Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993) (recognizing a fundamental right to education 
under the Minnesota Constitution); Danson v. Casey, 33 Pa. Cmwlth. 614, 626 (1978) 
(recognizing a fundamental right to education under the Pennsylvania Constitution); Brigham v. 
State, 166 Vt. 246, 268 (1997) (recognizing that under the Vermont Constitution, children 
should be afforded substantial equality of educational opportunity); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of 
King Cty. v. Washington, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 487 (Wash. 1978) (recognizing a fundamental right to 
education under the Washington Constitution); Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 478 (1989) 
(finding a fundamental right to education under the Wisconsin Constitution); Washakie Cty. 
Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 320 (Wyo. 1980) (recognizing a fundamental right 
to education under the Wyoming constitution). 
 22.  See infra Part IV. 
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Part I of this Note briefly describes tracking practices and a 
history of tracking in schools. Part II discusses the two federal actions 
that have traditionally shaped the tracking doctrine and why an equal 
protection approach is unworkable. Part III discusses an alternative 
legal doctrine under the Due Process Clause and how courts may find 
a fundamental right to education; it also discusses a potential 
litigation strategy based on states finding a right to a minimally 
adequate education through a substantive due process claim. Part IV 
offers strategies for how to use social science research to challenge 
tracking systems and show how the practice deprives students of a 
minimally adequate education. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Tracking Categorizes Students Based on Perceived Ability 
Tracking is a practice where schools assign students to different 
courses based on ability.23 Secondary schools typically employ 
tracking, while elementary schools may use “ability grouping.”24 
Ability grouping and tracking are often used interchangeably to 
describe the same system,25 but there can be marked differences in 
practice. While tracking strictly refers to assigning students to 
different classes within a school, ability grouping often takes place 
within a single classroom.26 In an elementary school classroom that 
incorporates ability grouping, a single teacher may separate students 
into different groups based on perceived ability and provide them 
with different instructions and activities.27 This Note will exclusively 
use the terminology of “tracking” to refer to separate classroom 
assignments with different teachers and distinct curricula, but courts 
will often label tracking systems as ability grouping models, and this 
Note will occasionally mention ability groupings in elementary 
 
 23.  Maureen T. Hallinan, Tracking: From Theory to Practice, in THE STRUCTURE OF 
SCHOOLING: READINGS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 188, 188 (Richard Arum et. al. 
eds., 2011). 
 24.  Tom Loveless, 2013 Brown Center Report on American Education: How Well Are 
American Students Learning?, 3 BROWN CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY AT BROOKINGS 14 (2013), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2013-brown-center-report-web-3.pdf. 
 25.  See id. at 13; KEVIN G. WELNER, LEGAL RIGHTS, LOCAL WRONGS 5 (2001). 
 26.  Loveless, supra note 24, at 13. 
 27.  Id. at 14. The report provides an example of ability grouping in elementary schools 
where the teacher might spend time instructing one group at a time. While this takes place, “the 
other students work independently—engaged in cooperative group activities or computer 
instruction or completing worksheets to reinforce skills. The teacher rotates among the groups 
so that each student receives a dose of teacher-led instruction in these small settings.” Id. 
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schools. However, it is still important to understand that “institutional 
sorting” can take place very early in a student’s educational career.28 
Tracking categorizes students based on their “perceived ability.”29 
First, educators and administrators try to evaluate “perceived 
abilities” based on many factors such as standardized test scores, IQ 
tests, grades, teacher recommendations, and parent requests.30 Once 
schools make their assessments, they assign students to distinctive 
academic “tracks” with different teachers and curricula.31 Historically, 
schools divided students into academic, general, or vocational tracks 
where the specific content of the curricula channeled students 
towards college or career after graduation.32 
Modern tracked classes take a number of different forms but 
frequently feature “course levels.”33 For example, schools may offer 
tracked courses such as English 10 for students of average perceived 
abilities and English 10 Honors for advanced learners. These classes 
may feature the same reading list with different expectations and 
assignments or may be constructed entirely differently. In 
mathematics tracks, greater variation may take place in curriculum 
subject matter because advanced math students may be able to 
choose Algebra II while lower achievers may be limited to Algebra I 
or Pre-Algebra.34 Offering Advanced Placement (AP) classes35 or 
International Baccalaureate (IB) in any subject may further divide 
students into different learning groups based on perceived abilities. 
Additionally, special education tracks often make up the bottom tier 
of student learners. Ultimately, students in tracked classes find 
themselves in homogenous learning groups where there are 
classrooms of “high, average, or low achievers”36 that systematically 
funnel students towards vocational or college-bound ends.37 
 
 28.  KAROLYN TYSON, INTEGRATION INTERRUPTED 1 (2011). 
 29.  1 EDUCATION LAW § 5:12, Westlaw (database updated December 2016). 
 30.  Daniel J. Losen, Silent Segregation in Our Nation’s Schools, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 517, 519 (1999). Most schools utilize standardized tests and grades. Id. However, as 
described in more detail in this section, these processes are subject to numerous biases and 
complexities that conflict with any perceptions of neutrality and fairness. 
 31.  Loveless, supra note 24, at 13. 
 32.  Hallinan, supra note 23, at 188. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Loveless, supra note 24, at 13. 
 35. Id. 
 36.  1 EDUCATION LAW § 5:12, Westlaw (database updated December 2016). 
 37.  Hallinan, supra note 23, at 188. 
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Evaluating students’ perceived abilities based solely on academic 
criteria is not always an objective process. For example, standardized 
test scores are a major factor for determining student assignments but 
also are highly criticized as a complicated and inaccurate measure of 
academic performance.38 Studies have shown that students from low-
income or minority backgrounds are more likely to perform poorly or 
fail on standardized tests.39 The test questions are often drafted in 
ways that require cultural capital that white, middle-class students 
have greater access to than low-income students of color.40 
Consequently, many also critique tracking for depending on such 
measures because gaps in performance do not accurately capture 
student potential but instead “mark class privilege.”41 In fact, 
although courts have not found testing per se unconstitutional as a 
means of assigning students, they have scrutinized the quality and 
results of such tests as well as a school’s inappropriate dependence on 
them.42 
Tracking assignments also result from many other factors outside 
of a child’s control. A prevalent misunderstanding is that academic 
placement in a track strongly reflects a student’s attitude towards 
school and a student’s (and parent’s) preference in a particular 
course.43 However, many socioeconomic factors lead to disparities in 
test scores, grades, and classroom performance including the quality of 
teaching and instruction in different tracks, a child’s parental 
involvement or support, and lower expectations shaped by “conscious 
 
 38.  Rachel F. Moran, Sorting and Reforming: High-Stakes Testing in the Public Schools, 34 
AKRON L. REV. 107, 116 (2000). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id at 117. One example of such cultural insensitivity is “a mandate that students with 
limited English proficiency take high-stakes tests only in English, a practice that effectively 
prevents them from fully demonstrating their academic skills.” Id. Another example cited in 
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), included a principal who spoke of black 
children’s limited familiarity with concepts that frequently appeared in tests and textbooks such 
as department stores and zoos; because black children often never ventured a few blocks from 
home and never visited department stores or zoos. 
 41.  Id. at 116. 
 42.  See, e.g., Lemon v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 444 F.2d 1400, 1401 (5th Cir. 1971) (declining 
to rule on the validity of testing per se); Moses v. Wash. Par. Sch. Bd., 330 F. Supp. 1340, 1345 
(E.D. La. 1971) (holding that testing cannot be used to resegregate students in a recently 
desegregated school system); Spangler v. Pasadena Cty. Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501, 519 
(C.D. Cal. 1970) (analyzing whether testing measures relied too much on verbal achievement); 
Hobson, 269 F. Supp. 480–85 (analyzing whether environmental, psychological, and cultural 
factors were disregarded when making inferences about the innate intellectual capabilities of 
black children based on standardized test norms). 
 43.  TYSON, supra note 28, at 2. 
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or unconscious racism.”44 Social and psychological factors cause 
discrepancies in academic achievement between different racial and 
socioeconomic groups of students and their disproportionate 
placement.45 Additionally, parents of minority students are less likely 
to be assertive in trying to advocate for their children’s placement in 
upper tracks.46 Despite these findings that student assignments to 
leveled courses are not always dependent on objective evaluations of 
student performance, tracking systems thrive. 
Additionally, prerequisites or “gate keeping” courses make tracks 
more rigid, which in turn makes it difficult for students to enroll in 
more challenging courses outside of the tracked path.47 Once students 
are assigned to low tracks in middle and high schools, it can be 
logistically impossible to switch tracks even if a student is willing and 
prepared. Schools do not always present information about 
prerequisites to students or parents in an effective manner so students 
can plan ahead.48 By failing to adequately convey the consequences of 
these early decisions, schools ensure that, on the whole, those who 
challenge tracking decisions are families with institutional knowledge 
and spare resources—often upper and middle class white families. 
Ultimately, there is a strong base of evidence showing that 
tracking systems in diverse schools often result in segregated classes.49 
In fact, schools with student demographics of between 30% and 60% 
black students are the most highly segregated.50 In such schools, poor 
and minority students are consistently overrepresented in low tracks 
while wealthier students are overrepresented in high tracks.51 
 
 44.  1 EDUCATION LAW § 5:12, Westlaw (database updated December 2016). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Losen, supra note 30, at 525. 
 47.  Id. at 519–20. 
 48.  Id. at 520. 
 49.  Robert E. Slavin, Achievement Effects of Ability Grouping in Secondary Schools: A 
Best Evidence Synthesis, 60 REV. OF EDUC. RES. 471, 473 (1990); Jomills Henry Braddock II & 
Marvin P. Dawkins, Ability Grouping, Aspirations, and Attainments: Evidence from the National 
Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988, 62 NEGRO EDUC. 324, 326–29 (1993); Samuel R. Lucas 
& Mark Berends, Sociodemographic Diversity, Correlated Achievement, and De Facto Tracking, 
75 SOC. OF EDUC. 328, 343 (2002); Samuel R. Lucas & Mark Berends, Race and Track Location 
in U.S. Public Schools, 25 RES. IN SOC. STRATIFICATION AND MOBILITY 169, 169–87 (2007). 
 50.  Charles Clotfelter et. al., Segregation and Resegregation in North Carolina Public 
Schools, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1375 (2003). 
 51.  OAKES, supra note 2, at 65–67, 175. 
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B. Tracking Has Historically Been Implemented to Segregate Students 
Dividing students by ability in schools has deep roots in racial 
segregation. This practice was affirmed in a Massachusetts case called 
Roberts v. City of Boston.52 In Roberts, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court held that Boston’s dual school system separating black 
and white students was lawful because the school committee had 
“plenary authority . . . to arrange, classify, and distribute pupils . . . as 
they think best adapted to their general proficiency and welfare.”53 
Roberts was thus the first to hold that school authorities should be 
able to serve the distinct educational needs of black and white 
children by segregating them. Later cases also reflected the prevailing 
idea that black students were intellectually inferior to white students, 
upholding segregated schooling because of “natural distinction[s] 
between the races” and rejecting the idea that ability grouping based 
on racial classifications was discriminatory.54 
From the late 19th century to early 20th century, a rapidly-growing 
influx of immigrants also drove tracking implementation in schools.55 
Student enrollment increased from 200,000 to over 1.5 million 
between 1880 and 1918, and new high schools were built to keep up 
with the population increase.56 The demographics critically shifted so 
that students with foreign-born parentage made up 58% of all 
students in thirty-seven of the nation’s largest cities.57 No longer were 
schools made up of mostly white Anglo-Saxon middle-class students; 
poor rural families and European immigrants were rushing to 
American cities to take advantage of compulsory education.58 
Furthermore, the newest immigrants coming from southern and 
eastern Europe “had darker skin” and markedly different languages, 
religions, and traditions than the northern and western 
EuropeanAmericans.59 
 
 52.  59 Mass. 198, 208 (1849). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Teaching Inequality: The Problem of Public School Tracking, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 
1320–21 (1989) (citing 9 People ex rel King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 450 (1883)); see also Ward 
v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874) (holding that white and black students must attend different schools); 
Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 361 (1874) (“[T]here . . . must be a classification of the children 
[that] ought to and will reference to some properties or characteristics common to or possessed 
by a certain number of the whole; and these classes may be . . . taught in different parts of the 
same school, or in different rooms in the same school- house, or different school-houses . . . .”). 
 55.  OAKES, supra note 2, at 19. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 19–20. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 25. 
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At the same time, scientific theories about intelligence, 
particularly Social Darwinism, were beginning to take hold and 
provide justification for schools to segregate the incoming immigrants 
from the more traditional middle-class white Americans.60 Social 
Darwinism established ethnocentric ideas that biological forces were 
the cause of inferior characteristics of certain population groups and 
that it was possible to change the environment for such lesser groups 
to improve their “evolutionary” development.61 Educators and 
administrators used these principles to rationalize dividing students 
who were “destined for college” from those “destined for low-level 
jobs” into separate tracks and were thus able to segregate students by 
social class and ethnicity.62 
Although tracking was very popular by the 1920s, these structures 
declined significantly starting in the late 1930s.63 Schools responded to 
studies showing that tracking and ability grouping practices had little 
or no effect on achievement gains and that placement in lower tracks 
negatively impacted students.64 Though tracking practices ultimately 
declined between 1935 and 1955,65 gifted programs, or enrichment 
classes that would take students out of the regular classroom 
curriculum, became a predominant form of grouping students by 
ability to separate certain ethnic groups from western and northern 
European Americans.66 
Tracking practices resurged after Brown v. Board of Education as 
a vestige of former de jure segregation; schools sought to resegregate 
students by race under the guise of perceived ability.67 Many southern 
schools deliberately adopted tracking systems to circumvent 
desegregation orders.68 Additionally, schools in northern states used 
tracked courses to isolate the large influx of black students migrating 
into the cities.69 Tracking was again legitimized based on 
 
 60.  Id. at 16–17, 25. 
 61.  Id. at 23. 
 62.  Losen, supra note 30, at 520 n.21. 
 63.  Id.; Teaching Inequality: The Problem of Public School Tracking, supra note 54, at 
1323. 
 64.  Teaching Inequality: The Problem of Public School Tracking, supra note 54, at 1323. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Losen, supra note 30, at 520–21. 
 67. Id. at 520. After Brown, “there was a dramatic increase in the use of ability grouping as 
a means of circumventing court-ordered desegregation, particularly in the southern states.” Id. 
at 521. 
 68.  Teaching Inequality: The Problem of Public School Tracking, supra note 54, at 1323. 
 69.  Id. 
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misunderstandings about the perceived abilities of poor, black 
students.70 
Tracking declined in popularity again in the late 1980s-90s because 
of several instrumental studies that criticized the effects of tracking.71 
For example, Jeannie Oakes published the first edition of her 
influential book, Keeping Track, and showed evidence that black, 
Hispanic, and poor children were disproportionately placed in 
remedial classes while middle-class white children were assigned to 
honors classes.72 She, as well as other critics, charged tracking systems 
with “reproduc[ing] and perpetuat[ing] inequality” and argued that 
“although tracking is typically justified by educators as a strategic 
response to student heterogeneity, the practice is undergirded by 
normative beliefs regarding race and class—and politically defended 
by white, middle-class parents to protect privilege.”73 Such critiques 
drove political organizations to condemn tracking and many schools 
answered the call to detrack.74 
However, since the 2000s, schools have again increased the use of 
ability grouping practices,75 perhaps as a response to the 
accountability demands of the No Child Left Behind Act.76 Although 
there is more data showing a dramatic rise in ability groupings in 
elementary schools,77 there is not as much data following the growth 
 
 70.  See id. Despite the fact that Brown explicitly prohibited school segregation, 
“misconceptions about the intellectual ability of poor and minority students continued to result 
in their segregation in public schools in both the North and the South.” Id. 
 71.  Loveless, supra note 24, at 15. Studies in the 1970s and 1980s criticized tracking 
because of its effects on race and class. A common critique was that “[g]rouping students by 
ability, no matter how it is done, will inevitably separate students by characteristics that are 
correlated statistically with measures of ability, including race, ethnicity, native language, and 
class.” Id. See also generally Robert E. Slavin, Ability Grouping and Student Achievement in 
Elementary Schools: A Best Evidence Synthesis, 57 REV. OF EDUC. RES. 293 (1987) (criticizing 
ability grouping for failing to improve academic achievement); OAKES, supra note 2 (criticizing 
tracking as an ineffective educational practice that creates inequitable opportunities for 
learning). 
 72.  OAKES, supra note 2, at 65–67. 
 73.  Loveless, supra note 24, at 15. 
 74.  Id. Organizations such as the National Governors Association, the American Civil 
Liberties Union, the Children’s Defense Fund, and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
condemned tracking practices. Id. 
 75.  Id. at 17–20. 
 76.  Id. at 20. The No Child Left Behind Act demanded that schools grant more attention 
to students who scored below “proficiency” on state exams. This pressure may have encouraged 
schools to serve this group through a low-track class. Id. 
 77.  Id. at 17. The data shows that the percentage of 4th grade students placed in ability 
groups rose from 39% in reading and 41% in math in 2000 and then 71% in reading and 54% in 
math in 2009. Id. 
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of tracking in secondary schools.78 The National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP) has collected the most data on tracking 
in math from 1990–2011 and found only a slight dip in prevalence in 
the 1990s and a small increase in the 2000s.79 In English Language 
Arts classes, NAEP found that 60% of students were in tracked 
classes in 1990, 32% in 1998, and then 43% in 2003.80 
II. THE HISTORY OF TRACKING LITIGATION UNDER THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board Education81 laid 
an important framework for future litigation against tracking 
structures in schools. Brown firmly signaled the end of de jure 
segregation,82 but left open questions concerning the legality of de 
facto segregation. Later courts would interpret Brown to mean that 
alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause under the 
Fourteenth Amendment would require a finding of discriminatory 
intent rather than segregative effects resulting from neutral actions or 
circumstances.83 This limitation would greatly hinder challenges to 
tracking when schools implemented the system without explicit bias, 
but nonetheless created racially isolated learning environments within 
the school. 
The Supreme Court has not heard a case on school tracking, but 
other federal courts have reviewed the constitutionality of tracking 
practices. Tracking and ability grouping are not unconstitutional per 
se,84 but courts have developed a generally consistent doctrine to 
evaluate the legitimacy of such structures. There are three major types 
of federal actions used to overcome tracking systems which have been 
coined by Kevin G. Welner and Jeannie Oakes: Type-I (Original Equal 
Protection), Type-II (Past Intentional Discrimination), and Type-III 
(Title VI).85 However, this Note will only describe Type I and Type II, 
which have more definitive doctrines. Ultimately, the equal protection 
 
 78.  Id. at 18. 
 79.  Id. at 17. 
 80.  Id. The last survey was conducted in 2003, so it is unclear if the trend has continued. Id. 
at 18. 
 81.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 82.  Id. at 494. 
 83.  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1976). 
 84.  See, e.g., Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 490 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007), 
as clarified on denial of reh’g, 521 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2008); McNeal v. Tate Cty. Sch. Dist., 508 
F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 85.  Welner & Oakes, supra note 7, at 454–55. 
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doctrine’s allowance of de facto segregation makes it unusable for 
challenging today’s tracking systems. 
A. Type I: Original Equal Protection 
Type I actions proceed under traditional equal protection doctrine. 
Plaintiffs may challenge schools’ tracking practices as a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause if they show both a disparate impact and 
a discriminatory intent.86 If both of these elements are met, 
particularly the requisite intent, a school’s acts will be analyzed under 
strict scrutiny.87 Any tracking system employed to intentionally 
segregate students by race is unconstitutional.88 However, Type I cases 
are relatively infrequent because proving discriminatory intent is such 
a high burden.89 
Early tracking challenges did not require a finding of 
discriminatory intent. For example, in the seminal case Hobson v. 
Hansen,90 the D.C. school district implemented a rigid four track 
system in its primary and secondary schools shortly after it started to 
desegregate it schools.91 Using equal protection analysis,92 the district 
court found that the tracking system violated black and poor 
children’s rights to equal educational opportunities.93 Although there 
was some evidence that administrators were implementing many 
other school policies (besides tracking) in a discriminatory manner, 
the court did not attack the tracking system specifically because of an 
underlying purpose to resegregate students.94 Instead, the court 
focused on how standardized aptitude tests sorted students 
disproportionately on the basis of race.95 The court held that 
 
 86.  People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 851 F. Supp. 905, 931 
(N.D. Ill. 1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 111 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 87.  Id. at 910. 
 88.  Id. at 910 (“It is a violation when intentional governmental conduct has created or 
perpetuated the segregative conditions.”); Morales v. Shannon, 516 F.2d 411, 412–14 (5th Cir. 
1975); McNeal, 508 F.2d at 1020. 
 89.  Welner & Oakes, supra note 7, at 454. 
 90.  269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). 
 91.  Id. at 411, 442. 
 92.  Id. at 511. 
 93.  Id. at 406. 
 94.  See id. at 514. The court found it persuasive that “[t]he evidence shows that the 
method by which track assignments are made depends essentially on standardized aptitude tests 
which, although given on a system-wide basis, are completely inappropriate for use with a large 
segment of the study body.” Id. 
 95.  See id. at 480–82 (discussing the inadequacies of the standard aptitude tests because of 
environmental and psychological factors). 
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[b]ecause these tests are standardized primarily on and are 
relevant to a white middle class group of students, they produce 
inaccurate and misleading tests scores when given to lower class 
and Negro students. As a result, rather than being classified 
according to ability to learn, these students are in reality being 
classified according to their socio-economic or racial status, or – 
more precisely – according to environmental and psychological 
factors which have nothing to do with innate ability.96 
Ultimately, the court found the tracking structure unconstitutional 
because of its disparate impact on black and poor students, rather 
than finding a systematic effort to resegregate.97 
However, the disparate impact analysis was foreclosed by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis,98 a case that 
focused on the disparate effects of written personnel examinations 
that were a component of a police department application. The Court 
changed the framework of the Equal Protection Clause so that 
disproportionate impact on different racial groups alone does not 
make a law unconstitutional.99 The Court held that a finding of 
“invidious discrimination” demands discriminatory intent; thus, the 
tracking doctrine under the equal protection analysis now requires 
plaintiffs to show the requisite intent.100 Circumstantial evidence can 
be used to prove intent in tracking cases.101 Such evidence may include 
 
 96.  Id. at 514. 
 97.  See id. at 513. The court recognized that 
the law has a special concern for minority groups for whom the judicial branch of 
government is often the only hope for redressing their legitimate grievances; and a 
court will not treat lightly a showing that educational opportunities are being allocated 
according to a pattern that has unmistakable signs of invidious discrimination. 
Defendants, therefore, have a weighty burden of explaining why the poor and the 
Negro should be those who populate the lower ranks of the track system. 
Id. 
 98.  426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
 99.  Id. The court held that a facially neutral law is 
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater 
proportion of one race than of another. Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but 
it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the 
Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule, that racial classifications are 
to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of 
considerations. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 100.  See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 851 F. Supp. 905, 
910 (N.D. Ill. 1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 111 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 1997). The court stated the 
rule for establishing unconstitutional racial imbalance within a school system: “the plaintiff must 
show that the governmental authorities created or maintained racial segregation in the schools 
and that their actions were motivated by segregative intent.” Id. at 910. 
 101.  Id. at 911 (citations omitted). 
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“1) the historical background and sequence of events leading up to 
the conduct maintaining or exacerbating racial imbalance in the 
schools; 2) departures from typical procedural sequences or 
substantive criteria normally considered important by the 
decisionmaker; and, 3) contemporaneous evidence concerning the 
decision-making process.”102 Furthermore, if a plaintiff can show 
discriminatory intent and causation, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to prove that “the same segregative conduct would have 
occurred even had the impermissible purpose not been considered.”103 
Finding discriminatory intent is very difficult without being able to 
point to a history of de jure segregation. There are only a couple of 
cases where plaintiffs have been able to successfully challenge 
tracking under these circumstances.104 For example, in People Who 
Care v. Rockford Board of Education, plaintiffs claimed that the 
Illinois school district engaged in systematic discriminatory practices 
which included tracking.105 The school district did not have a history 
of explicit de jure segregation, but the court held that a pattern of 
discriminatory practices “occurred over a substantial period of time 
and in a substantial portion of the Rockford public schools and 
constituted a system-wide attempt to separate the races.”106 The court 
found that the district intentionally discriminated against students of 
color by analyzing the consistently disproportionate assignment of 
students of color to lower tracked courses, the district’s knowledge of 
these disparities and “woefully inadequate efforts” to remedy the 
differences in opportunities, and the district’s practice of placing black 
students whose achievement scores qualified them for two or more 
tracks in the lower track.107 Additionally, the court used testimony 
 
 102.  Id. at 931 (citations omitted). 
 103.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104.  Id. at 933–34; Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 513 (D.D.C. 1967). 
 105.  See People Who Care, 851 F. Supp. at 908, 911. Other discriminatory practices included 
drawing school boundaries to increase racial segregation; providing inequitable transportation 
to students based upon their race, providing inequitable facilities and equipment to students of 
color in segregated schools, and placing students of color disproportionately in special education 
programs. Id. at 933. 
 106.  Id. at 933. 
 107.  Id. at 913–14. The court stated 
[t]he evidence clearly supports a finding that the mistracking resulted in unfavorable 
treatment for minority students. The ultimate result of this mistracking was that 
minority students whose achievement scores qualified them for regular and basic 
tracks were far more likely to be placed in the lower than the higher track for which 
they qualified, and white students were far more likely to be placed in the higher track 
than the lower track when their achievement scores qualified them for both tracks. 
Id. at 915. 
WONG FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 8/6/2018  5:50 PM 
178 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 13 
from the district’s personnel corroborating an intent to segregate 
minority students from white students in its other practices besides 
tracking.108 People Who Care may stand for the proposition that 
severe discriminatory effects coupled with blatant knowledge of 
inaccurate placement of students is required to show intent.109 
Though not a case on school tracking, Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1110 is relevant to the 
tracking original equal protection doctrine because of its implications 
for de facto segregation. The Supreme Court heard two cases 
concurrently challenging school assignment practices on the basis of 
race.111 In one case, Seattle School District No 1. sought to create 
racial balance in its schools even without a history of previous de jure 
segregation.112 The district characterized a school as “oversubscribed” 
if the demographics were not within ten percentage points of the 
district’s overall white/nonwhite racial proportion and allowed the use 
of a racial tiebreaker to admit students into schools to correct the 
imbalance.”113 In the second case, Jefferson County Public Schools 
adopted a voluntary student assignment plan where all nonmagnet 
schools had to maintain a “minimum black enrollment of 15% and a 
maximum black enrollment of 50%,” despite the fact that Jefferson 
County School District had just achieved unitary status the year 
before.114 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the plurality opinion and was joined 
by Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas. The plurality opinion first held 
that “when the government distributes burdens or benefits on the 
basis of individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed under 
strict scrutiny.”115 The Court could have held that when a government 
or law benefits people of a historically discriminated group, strict 
 
 108.  Id. at 914. 
 109.  See id. The court stated, 
[t]he defendant also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the defendant did 
not track students objectively and had a rigid tracking program. The defendant 
attributes these inequities to “mistakes” and not “intentional discrimination.” The 
evidence on this point is replete with statistical, documentary and anecdotal support 
which establishes that the defendant was aware of the problem, but chose to do 
nothing to correct it. 
Id. 
 110.  551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 111.  Id. at 710–11. 
 112.  Id. at 711–12. 
 113.  Id. at 712. 
 114.  Id. at 715–16. 
 115.  Id. at 720. 
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scrutiny is not appropriate; however, the plurality did not recognize a 
distinction between classifications that “burden” or “benefit.”116 
Because the school assignment plans were subject to strict scrutiny, 
the school districts had the burden of showing that the use of racial 
classifications were “narrowly tailored” to achieve a “compelling” 
government interest.117 
The Court stipulated that there were two possible compelling 
interests that the school districts could show.118 First, the school could 
use racial classifications to remedy the effects of past intentional 
discrimination.119 However, the Court quickly dismissed this 
possibility in these two cases by asserting that there had never been 
de jure segregation in Seattle public schools,120 and noting that 
Jefferson County had achieved unitary status.121 Secondly, the school 
could promote viewpoint diversity as established in Grutter v. 
Bollinger.122 However, the Court interpreted Grutter to limit the 
interest in promoting viewpoint diversity to the unique institutional 
needs of universities.123 
Furthermore, the plurality opinion rejected racial balancing as a 
compelling state interest, despite the defendant school district’s 
arguments that racially diverse learning environments benefit 
students educationally and socially.124 The plurality found the practice 
of racial balancing troubling because it would continue to promote 
the use of race in governmental decision-making.125 Additionally, 
 
 116.  See id. (“It is well established that when the government distributes burdens or 
benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed under strict 
scrutiny . . . . [R]acial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact 
connection between justification and classification.”). 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 721. The district court had found that Jefferson County had “eliminated the 
vestiges associated with the former policy of segregation and its pernicious effects . . .  Jefferson 
County accordingly does not rely upon an interest in remedying the effects of past intentional 
discrimination in defending its present use of race in assigning students.” Id. 
 122.  Id. at 722–23. 
 123.  Id. at 724. 
 124.  Id. at 725. 
 125.  Id. at 730. The Court stated that 
[a]ccepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would justify the imposition 
of racial proportionality throughout American society, contrary to our repeated 
recognition that at the heart of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection lies 
the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as 
simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class. 
Id. 
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addressing racial imbalance caused by factors other than segregation 
via state action (essentially, de facto segregation) does not qualify as a 
compelling interest.126 The plurality opinion essentially cut off any 
future arguments that there is ever a compelling interest in remedying 
the effects of de facto segregation in schools. 
Racial classifications are rarely used to track or de-track students 
in today’s schools. However, any tracking systems that are the result 
of de facto segregation rather than intentional discrimination cannot 
rely on racial balancing as a compelling interest to overturn the 
system because strict scrutiny applies if any sort of classification is 
used. Additionally, Parents Involved reflects a further limitation on 
plaintiffs’ use of equal protection doctrine to combat de facto 
segregation and the Supreme Court’s current support for such 
limitations. Therefore, Type I challenges are now unlikely to provide a 
workable doctrine for challenging modern tracking systems. 
B. Type II: Past Intentional Discrimination 
Type II federal actions are much more commonly used to 
challenge tracking.127 The doctrine under Type II actions is not 
necessarily distinct from an equal protection analysis, but it is an 
expansion in specific contexts.128 Type II actions generally govern 
conflicts that emerge in schools in the process of securing release from 
the mandates of their desegregation order or where plaintiffs move to 
modify their district’s desegregation orders.129 While courts give less 
deference to school districts are or were recently under a 
desegregation order,130 Type II actions are not available to the vast 
majority of schools with newly changed demographics with diverse 
student populations. 
First, plaintiffs may challenge tracking by showing that the 
school’s practices perpetuate or reestablish a dual school system that 
separates racial groups.131 If the court finds that tracking causes 
significant segregative effects, the school may justify the structure by 
showing that its practices “(1) are not based on the present results of 
past discrimination or (2) will remedy such present results through 
 
 126.  Id. at 736. 
 127.  WELNER, supra note 25, at 40. 
 128.  Oakes & Welner, supra note 7, at 454 (characterizing Type II actions as being for 
preexisting desegregation orders). 
 129.  WELNER, supra note 25, at 40. 
 130.  See infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 131.  McNeal v. Tate Cty. Sch. Dist., 508 F.2d 1017, 1019–20 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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better educational opportunities.”132 Most of these cases hinge on 
whether the practices result from a school’s previous discriminatory 
practices or, alternatively, whether the school had the requisite intent 
to discriminate on the basis of race. 
After a court finds segregative effects, it will look to a school’s 
previous history of either de jure segregation or any past intentional 
discrimination.133 Most cases challenging tracking emerged where 
schools were or had previously been operating under desegregation 
orders.134 Under these circumstances, the court may be more skeptical 
of the tracking practice because resegregating students on the basis of 
ability essentially resegregates students by race.135 Furthermore, “a 
relatively recent history of discrimination may be probative evidence 
of a discriminatory motive which, when coupled with evidence of the 
segregative effect of ability grouping practices, may support a finding 
of unconstitutional discrimination.”136 Courts thus grant the plaintiffs 
a presumption that former de jure segregation has a connection with 
the discriminatory effects at issue.137 
Many cases also feature conflicts in schools that achieved unitary 
status shortly before the tracking lawsuit or while the school was 
seeking unitary status from the courts. A school district achieves 
“unitary status” when it has “abandoned the ‘dual’ status of 
‘intentional segregation by race,’” complying with the Constitution’s 
command under the Fourteenth Amendment.138 The status also 
indicates that the district has “eliminated the vestiges of prior [de 
jure] segregation to the greatest extent practicable[.]”139 Cases such as 
 
 132.  Quarles v. Oxford Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 868 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 133.  Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. State of Ga., 775 F.2d 1403, 1413 
(11th Cir. 1985) (“In evaluating the constitutional validity of ability grouping, courts have 
acknowledged the importance of examining the school district’s history of segregation.”). 
 134.  See, e.g., Lemon v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971); Moses v. 
Washington Par. Sch. Bd., 330 F. Supp 1340 (E.D. La. 1971), aff’d, 56 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 135.  Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 996 (5th Cir. 1981). One rationale for much closer 
judicial scrutiny of school districts with a previous history of de jure discrimination is that 
“ability grouping, when employed in such transitional circumstances may perpetuate the effects 
of past discrimination by resegregating, on the basis of ability, students were previously 
segregated in inferior schools on the basis of race or national origin.” Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  See Berry v. Sch. Dist., 442 F. Supp. 1280, 1294–95 (W.D. Mich. 1977) (“A presumption 
of segregative intent arises when plaintiffs establish that the natural, probable, and foreseeable 
result of public officials’ action or inaction was an increase or perpetuation of public school 
segregation. The presumption becomes proof unless defendants affirmatively establish that their 
action or inaction was a consistent and resolution application of racially neutral policies.”). 
 138.  Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 487 (1992). 
 139.  Spurlock v. Fox, 716 F.3d 383, 386 (6th Cir. 2013) (citations and quotations omitted). 
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these range from shortly after Brown to modern day. For example, in 
Hoots v. Pennsylvania,140 a Pennsylvania district petitioned for unitary 
school status in 1999 when the court had previously ruled in 1973 that 
district was engaging in de jure discrimination.141 Although the court 
found that the district provided all students with an equal educational 
opportunity after complying with its desegregation order, it revised 
the order to eliminate tracking.142 More recently in 2014, a suit 
challenged the tracking practices in a Florida school that had 
achieved unitary status in 2012 after forty-two years under a 
desegregation order; the court ultimately found that the tracking 
system did not improperly consider race.143 
If a school has attained unitary status or has always been a unitary 
school district, tracking practices are more difficult to challenge. First, 
the school must show that the school district has been operating as a 
unitary school for a sufficient period of time before legitimizing any 
practice that results in a dual school system.144 If the school district 
has been recognized as a unitary school for a satisfactory amount of 
time, the court does not automatically find that school tracking 
practices are based on the “present results of past segregation[.]”145 
Instead, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the unitary school 
districted implemented the tracking system with an intent to 
discriminate.146 Finally, even if racial segregation in tracked courses is 
the present result of past segregation or the school district 
intentionally discriminated against racial groups, the practice can still 
pass constitutional muster if it can “remedy the results of past 
segregation through better educational opportunities.”147 
Ultimately, like Type I claims based on the original equal 
protection doctrine, Type II claims are only practicable if there is a 
specific legal history of de jure discrimination. Without previous 
intentional discrimination, tracking litigants are unlikely to prevail 
with claims based on equal protection. 
 
 140.  118 F. Supp. 2d 577 (W.D. Pa. 2000). 
 141.  Id. at 580, 583. 
 142.  Id. at 613. 
 143.  United States v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1349, 1351 (N.D. Fl. 
2014). 
 144.  Lemon v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 444 F.2d 1400, 1401 (5th Cir. 1971); Simmons v. 
Hooks, 843 F. Supp. 1296, 1302 (E.D. Ark. 1994); Moses v. Washington Par. Sch. Bd., 330 F. 
Supp 1340, 1345 (E.D. La. 1971), aff’d, 56 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 145.  Simmons, 843 F. Supp. at 1302. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
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III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AS A POSSIBLE LITIGATION 
STRATEGY 
Challenges against tracking systems may not have much success 
under an equal protection claim without showing an explicit history of 
discrimination in school, but a substantive due process claim may 
provide different avenues of attack in both federal and state courts. 
There is no federal fundamental right to education, but the Supreme 
Court has not dismissed the possibility of a fundamental right to some 
level of basic education.148 State courts recognize the right to 
education much more expansively; because courts are more likely to 
interpret stronger state obligations to provide a minimally adequate 
education, tracking litigants should probably bring state claims under 
substantive due process violations. 
A. The Fundamental Right to an Education in Substantive Due 
Process 
i. Federal Substantive Due Process Protects Specific Fundamental 
Rights 
The Fourteenth Amendment protects certain rights through the 
Due Process Clause.149 The Due Process Clause protects both 
procedural and substantive rights.150 The Fourteenth Amendment 
does not include explicit language protecting substantive rights, but 
the Supreme Court has traditionally recognized the protection of such 
rights under the Constitution.151 
There are three components of substantive due process. First, the 
Due Process Clause prohibits the states from violating citizens’ 
enumerated rights under the Bill of Rights.152 Much of the Bill of 
Rights is “incorporated” by the Fourteenth Amendment, with a few 
 
 148.  See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1973) (“Even if it 
were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected 
prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication that the present 
levels of educational expenditure in Texas provide an education that falls short . . . as is true in 
the present case—no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child with 
an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of 
speech and of full participation in the political process.”). 
 149.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 150.  Id. (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”). 
 151.  1 STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 1:16, Westlaw 
(database updated November 2017). 
 152.  Id. 
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exceptions.153 Second, the Court can draw from the Due Process 
Clause as a source for finding unenumerated “liberties” or 
fundamental rights.154 Only fundamental rights warrant the highest 
security under strict scrutiny analysis.155 Finally, substantive due 
process protects citizens from arbitrary abuses of power by 
government officials.156 
The Court has articulated a general framework for finding new 
fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court 
initially uses a method of narrowly defining fundamental rights that 
are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”157 Next, the Court must 
provide a “careful description” of the asserted fundamental liberty 
interest.158 Rights such as marriage or the right of parents to guide the 
upbringing of their children have been found by this method.159 
However, the Court has at times been willing to go even beyond 
enumerated rights and liberties rooted in “history and tradition” to 
reflect evolving social trends and focus on matters “central to 
personal dignity and autonomy.”160 
ii. There Is No Current Federal Fundamental Right to Education 
The Supreme Court has refused to recognize a fundamental right 
to education under the Constitution. The Court has addressed the 
question of whether the Due Process Clause protects a federal 
fundamental right to education in two of significant cases. In San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,161 parents 
 
 153.  Peter S. Smith. Addressing the Plight of Inner-City Schools: The Federal Right to 
Education After Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 825, 848–49 
(1997). 
 154.  1 STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 1:16, Westlaw 
(database updated November 2017). 
 155.  Id. When the court designates a liberty interest as fundamental, “government may not 
interfere with that right (infringement) unless it survives strict scrutiny analysis[.]” Id. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citations and quotations omitted). 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  1 STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 1:16, Westlaw 
(database updated November 2017); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (establishing 
the freedom to marry person of another race); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) 
(establishing the right of parents to have their children taught in a foreign language). 
 160. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 724–27 (discussing the Court’s precedents in finding 
fundamental rights “central to personal dignity and autonomy” in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. 
of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833 (1992)). 
 161.  411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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challenged the Texas financing system based on dramatic disparities in 
school funding from district to district.162 They asserted that the 
unequal spending per pupil interfered with their children’s 
fundamental right to an education.163 The Court stated that there was 
a possibility that there might be some “identifiable quantum of 
education [that] is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the 
meaningful exercise” of the right to speak or vote, but that there was 
no charge that Texas had failed “to provide each child with an 
opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the 
enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the 
political process.”164 Ultimately, the Court declined to hold that 
education was a fundamental right because it did not find that the 
Constitution explicitly or implicitly guaranteed such a right.165 The 
Court then applied a rational basis test and upheld the Texas school 
system, acknowledging the rational purpose of local control.166 
A decade later, the Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe167 established 
that although education is not a fundamental liberty, it is also not a 
mere governmental benefit.168 In Plyler, undocumented immigrant 
children were denied the opportunity to attend public schools in 
Texas.169 The Court again held that education was not a fundamental 
right, but applied a heightened scrutiny to review the Texas statute 
rather than rational basis.170 Because the children were “innocent” 
and could “affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own status,” 
the Court reasoned that the analysis should focus on whether the 
“State’s interests be substantial and that the means bear a ‘fair and 
substantial relation’ to these interests.”171 
The Court more explicitly identified education as an important 
liberty from Rodriguez by also implying that there is some minimum 
amount of education necessary to ensure that students could one day 
participate meaningfully in the democratic system.172 First, it 
 
 162.  Id. at 4–6, 13–16. 
 163.  Id. at 17. 
 164.  Id. at 36–37. 
 165.  Id. at 33–35. 
 166.  Id. at 54–55. 
 167.  457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 168.  Id. at 221. 
 169.  Id. at 205–06. 
 170.  Id. at 230. 
 171.  Id. at 220. 
 172.  Id. (“[As] . . . pointed out early in our history, . . . some degree of education is 
necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political 
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recognized the significance of education in laying a foundation of 
knowledge that would support “the preservation of a democratic 
system of government,” and also acknowledged that denial of an 
education has many permanent impacts on a child.173 It stated that “it 
is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in 
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.”174 This idea of a 
minimum level of education guaranteed to maintain the “fabric of our 
society”175 has opened the door to the possibility that the Supreme 
Court would apply the same heightened scrutiny when the right to an 
education has been violated.176 Plyler’s heightened scrutiny is most 
likely to apply in a case where there are three factors to consider: “[a] 
denial of educational opportunity; a disabling classification applied to 
an innocent group; and the gravity of the plaintiff’s harm.”177 
iii. Some State Constitutions Recognize a State Fundamental 
Right to Education 
States have been more willing to recognize a fundamental right to 
education than the federal courts.178 As opposed to federal courts’ 
assumption that constitutional rights under the Federal Constitution 
are “negative rights” where the government cannot interfere with 
granted rights,  but it does not have a duty to act, state constitutions 
often use “positive rights” language to describe the government’s 
affirmative duty to provide a public education.179 Some constitutional 
provisions are merely aspirational, while others have created and 
recognized a fundamental right.180 Consequently, the latter states have 
committed to a form of heightened scrutiny analysis under state 
substantive due process clauses181 and may be jurisdictions that would 
strongly favor plaintiffs in tracking litigation. 
Although state courts still consider federal case law on substantive 
due process because it is more developed and because state courts 
 
system if we are to preserve freedom and independence.”) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 221 (1972)). 
 173.  Id. at 221–22. The Court acknowledges the “inestimable toll of that deprivation on the 
social, economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of the individual.” Id. at 222. 
 174.  Id. at 223 (citation and quotation omitted). 
 175.  Id. at 221. 
 176.  Smith, supra note 153, at 841–43. 
 177.  Id. at 842. 
 178.  See supra note 21 (listing state cases finding a fundamental right to an education). 
 179.  Kelly Thompson Cochran, Beyond School Financing: Defining the Constitutional Right 
to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 399, 427–31 (2000). 
 180.  Id. at 431. 
 181.  Id. at 424. 
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seek to be consistent with federal precedent,182 plaintiffs in state 
courts have been much more successful in challenging local systems 
through a deprivation of a right to education claim. For example, 
plaintiffs have challenged the quality of educational resources in state 
funding cases and have succeeded in twenty-eight states,183 whereas 
unequal funding in San Antonio did not violate any fundamental right 
to education.184 
More notably, Sheff v. O’Neill185 focuses on an issue of de facto 
segregation that calls to mind the segregative effects of tracking in a 
state right to education case. In Sheff, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
held that there is a state constitutional imperative to remedy racial 
and ethnic isolation in Hartford’s schools which violated students’ 
fundamental right to education.186 Although there had been no state 
action because demographic patterns ultimately caused racial 
segregation,187 the Connecticut Supreme Court still found that the 
Connecticut Constitution “contains a fundamental right to education 
and a corresponding affirmative state obligation to implement and 
maintain that right.”188 This state constitutional imperative combined 
with another Connecticut constitutional provision in § 20 that “[n]o 
person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be 
subjected to segregation or discrimination . . . because of . . . race 
[or]  . . . ancestry . . .” compelled the court to engage in strict scrutiny 
analysis and condemned de facto segregation caused by 
neighborhood demographics.189 Ultimately, interpretations of state 
constitutions can provide a more expansive opportunity to grant 
remedies based on state doctrine that relies on a fundamental right to 
education. 
B. Courts Recognize a Right to a Minimum Adequate Education 
The Supreme Court has explicitly left open the question of 
whether there is a fundamental right to a minimum level of education, 
 
 182.  Id. 425–26. 
 183.  Daniel S. Greenspahn, A Constitutional Right to Learn: The Uncertain Allure of 
Making a Federal Case Out of Education, 59 S.C. L. REV. 755, 780 (2008). 
 184.  San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33–35 (1973). 
 185.  678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996). 
 186.  Id. at 1270–71. The court observed that social influences on racial isolation in schools 
such as neighborhood demographics; it also recognized that students’ ethnic and socioeconomic 
background impaired student performance in standardized testing. Id. at 1273. 
 187.  Id. at 1285. 
 188.  Id. at 1279. 
 189.  Id. at 1281–82. 
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but has implied that there may be such a right.190 Building on the 
jurisprudence of Rodriguez191 and Plyler,192 the Supreme Court and 
lower federal courts have grappled with finding a “minimally 
adequate education” as a legal conclusion in substantive due process 
cases.193 Many of the lower federal court cases focused on school 
funding in questions of educational adequacy194 because the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Rodriguez narrowly applied to school funding 
variations resulting solely from property tax variations.195 
Ultimately, courts are often willing to engage in a factual inquiry 
to determine whether a student has access to educational services and 
the potential impacts of being denied these services.196 For example, in 
Donnell C. v. Illinois State Board of Education,197 an Illinois federal 
district court denied a motion to dismiss a complaint based on the 
inadequacy of educational services for juvenile pretrial detainees.198 A 
showing that some students were “not being taught courses other 
than reading and math, did not have textbooks, workbooks or other 
instructional materials, and were not given learning disability 
assessment and instruction” were sufficient factual allegations to 
consider at trial.199 Courts may thus consider the quality of education 
being provided rather than just the opportunity to attend school when 
trying to find a minimum adequate level. 
A fundamental right to a minimum adequate education would be 
consistent with the jurisprudence in Rodriguez and Plyler and would 
 
 190.  Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 284 (1986). 
 191.  San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (“[N]o charge fairly could 
be made that the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic 
minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the 
political process.”). 
 192.  See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (“[As] . . . pointed out early in our 
history, . . . some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively 
and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence.”) 
(quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)) 
 193.  Kristen Safier, The Question of a Fundamental Right to a Minimally Adequate 
Education, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 993, 1005–07 (2001). 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  See Allain, 478 U.S. at 287 (“Rodriguez did not, however, purport to validate all 
funding variations that might result from a State’s public school funding decision. It held merely 
that the variations that resulted from allowing local control over local property tax funding of 
the public schools were constitutionally permissible in that case.”). 
 196.  See Safier, supra note 193, at 1005–07 (describing the Supreme Court’s and other 
courts approaches in determining whether there is a right to a minimally adequate education 
and how they looked beyond the mere participation in school). 
 197.  829 F. Supp. 1016 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
 198.  Id. at 1020. 
 199.  Id. at 1018. This case ultimately settled. Safier, supra note 193, at 1007. 
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also be rooted in the history and tradition of a right to acquire 
knowledge. In Meyer v. Nebraska,200 the Supreme Court struck down a 
statute forbidding teaching in any other language but English and any 
other language class until after eighth grade.201 The Court found that 
the legislature was interfering with “the opportunities of pupils to 
acquire knowledge[.]”202 Additionally, in Board of Education v. Pico, 
the Court found that removing books from a school library violated 
an important right to “receive information and ideas” which is an 
“inherent corollary of the rights of free speech and press[.]”203 
Denying students some level of information that infringes on their 
ability to participate in democratic society could be construed as the 
denial of some minimum level of quality education.204 
The Supreme Court’s hesitation in finding a fundamental right to 
a minimally adequate education is related to why it does not find that 
there is a general fundamental right to education: it is difficult to find 
an objective floor for the quality of education required.205 However, a 
federal threshold would not only be preferable for consistency 
reasons, but would also be more realizable today than it would have 
been when Rodriguez and Plyler were litigated. Congress has been 
more proactive in implementing mandatory national standards for 
public schools through the No Child Left Behind Act and Common 
Core Standards movement. Courts could tie a standard for a 
minimally adequate education to Congress’s federal mandates. 
Alternatively, a minimally adequate education could also be 
evaluated according to state standards.206 Thus, “the issue of a 
minimally adequate education would be collapsed into the question 
of what a state’s qualitative predetermined floor is.”207 If federal 
courts are reluctant to determine what level of scrutiny to apply, it 
 
 200.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400, 403 (1923). 
 201.  Id. at 403 . 
 202.  Id. at 401. 
 203.  Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 
(1982). 
 204.  See supra note 148 (conceding there may be a constitutionally minimum basic 
education to allow the meaningful exercise of the right to speak and vote); supra note 172 
(stating that there is some degree of education required to participate effectively in the 
democratic system). 
 205.  Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection: The 
First Step Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1407 
(2010). 
 206.  Id. at 1408. 
 207.  Id. 
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could defer to states and whether they view the education right as 
fundamental. 
C. Many States Recognize a Fundamental Right to a Minimally 
Adequate Education 
Every state constitution provides for free public education.208 
Though not all states recognize a fundamental right to education, 
many still interpret their constitutions to grant a minimum basic 
education.209 There is still no consistent standard for what adequacy 
entails, but several states stand out as models for how states approach 
adequacy standards. 
One model is to follow state statutory or administrative standards 
to define a minimum adequate education. For example, in Seattle 
School District v. State, plaintiffs challenged the state’s method of 
raising “special excess levy elections,” where school districts could 
supplement insufficient state funding for public schools by seeking 
more funding from the local electorate.210 Voters were never required 
to approve the request, and school districts had no independent 
authority to raise funds; thus, schools often operated with insufficient 
money to support its educational programs.211 Plaintiffs brought a 
claim that the “State had failed to discharge its ‘paramount duty’ to 
make ‘ample provision for the education’ of its resident children” and 
to “provide for a general and uniform system of public schools” 
pursuant to the Washington Constitution.212 The court interpreted the 
constitutional provision213 and found that the Legislature intended 
that the State provide “basic education” as opposed to “total 
education.”214 Nonetheless, the State had a constitutional duty to 
teach “beyond mere reading, writing, and arithmetic” and create 
“broad educational opportunities . . . in the contemporary setting to 
equip our children for their role as citizens and as potential 
competitors in today’s market as well as in the market place of 
ideas.”215 These principles for an effective education shape the 
 
 208.  Barry Friedman & Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 92, 129 (2013). 
 209.  Id.; Cochran, supra note 179, at 437–38. 
 210.  Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 77–78 (Wash. 1978). 
 211.  Id. at 78. During the 1975-1976 year, 40% of students in the state were in districts 
operating under budget. Id. 
 212.  Id. The Court interpreted Const. art. 9, § 1 and 2 of the Washington constitution. Id. 
 213.  Id.at 94. 
 214.  Id. at 95. 
 215.  Id. at 94. 
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essential skills and opportunities that would make up the minimum of 
the education that is constitutionally required in Washington.216 
Ultimately, the court held that it was the legislature’s duty to define 
and give substantive meaning to the constitutional provision requiring 
education and declined to configure a judicial standard.217 Other 
states have followed this approach and allowed their legislatures to 
shape the minimally adequate education standard with specific 
guidelines.218 
Alternatively, some courts have established judicially created 
requirements. In Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.,219 the 
Kentucky Supreme Court interpreted its constitution220 to require the 
state to provide all students with an “efficient” education, or an 
“equal opportunity to have an adequate education.”221 The Court also 
articulated particular guidelines that would not only become the 
substantive content of the constitutional requirement, but would also 
become the prototype for other states’ standard for a minimally 
adequate education.222 These standards included: 
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable 
students to function in a complex and rapidly changing 
civilization; 
(ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political 
systems to enable the student to make informed choices; 
(iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to 
 
 216.  Id. at 95. 
 217.  Id. at 95. This case was later overruled by the Washington Basic Education Act of 
1977, which ultimately communicated a statutory standard for a basic education. Fed. Way Sch. 
Dist. No. 210 v. State, 219 P.3d 941, 947 (Wash. 2009). 
 218.  See Idaho Sch. For Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 734 (1993) 
(holding that school districts follow the state board of education requirements); Unified Sch. 
Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994) (holding that the minimally adequate 
education standard should follow those education standards adopted by the Kansas 
Legislature); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993) (holding that the court should follow 
Minnesota’s minimum accreditation standards). 
 219.  Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
 220.  Id. at 205. The Kentucky Constitution states that “[t]he General Assembly shall, by 
appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the 
State.” Id. at 200. 
 221.  Id. at 211. 
 222.  Cochran, supra note 179, at 413. See also Bonner v. Daniels, 885 N.E.2d 673, 693 n.9 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008), transfer granted, opinion vacated (Sept. 24, 2008), vacated, 907 N.E.2d 516 
(Ind. 2009). Massachusetts, Arkansas, and New Hampshire explicitly adopted Kentucky’s 
standards. Id. Kansas also adopted Kentucky’s standards. Gannon v. State, 402 P.3d 513, 524 
(Kan. 2017). Other states have also been influenced by Kentucky’s standards such as Alabama 
and South Carolina. Bonner, 885 N.E.2d at 693 n.9. 
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enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or 
her community, state, and nation; 
(iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her 
mental and physical wellness; 
(v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to 
appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; 
(vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training 
in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each 
child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and 
(vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to 
enable public school students to compete favorably with 
their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in 
the job market.223 
These standards ultimately emphasize a minimum level of 
knowledge and skills that each child requires to achieve success in 
academic and vocational fields. These standards also emphasize the 
necessary skills and knowledge to engage with the political and social 
community. Some states have adopted these exact guidelines, while 
others have developed their own.224 
IV. STRATEGIES USING SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT 
TRACKING DEPRIVES STUDENTS IN LOW-TRACKED CLASSES OF A 
MINIMALLY ADEQUATE EDUCATION 
Overturning tracking systems is not easily achieved by challenging 
a school’s action under federal substantive due process grounds, but 
this approach has a greater likelihood of success than under equal 
protection grounds. Ideally, the Supreme Court and federal courts 
would shift from the Rodriguez jurisprudence and further develop the 
Plyler framework in applying a heightened review when the 
educational opportunities of discriminated groups of people are at 
stake. Even if the federal courts recognize a fundamental right to a 
minimally adequate education, the courts will still have to determine a 
standard of adequate education—a standard that will either be tied to 
a Congressional standard, a wholly new judicial standard, or one 
based on those of the state courts. 
 
 223.  Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212. 
 224.  Cochran, supra note 179, at 416. Other states that have developed their own criteria 
including Alabama, North Carolina, New York, and South Carolina. Id. 
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Currently, tracking litigants have the best chance of success 
utilizing a state substantive due process claim proceeding in states 
that recognize education as a fundamental right. Furthermore, 
jurisdictions that recognize a right to a minimally adequate education 
may be even more favorable because “the adequacy approach pose[s] 
much less risk of creating broad new rights to government services 
because courts [can] base their decisions on the unique language of 
their constitutions’ education articles.”225 In states that recognize 
neither, litigants may have to argue first for the right and second for a 
standard based on judicially created criteria similar to those 
established in Kentucky.226 
Litigants challenging tracking in states with little constitutional or 
legislative guidance for a minimally adequate education can use the 
arguments outlined in the rest of Part IV. These arguments closely 
follow Kentucky’s Rose standards227 and are supported by social 
science research. Kentucky’s standards generally focus on three major 
objectives: (1) equip students with a sufficient base of skills and 
knowledge; (2) prepare students for future employment and 
educational pursuits; and (3) enable students to compete favorably 
with other students in future employment and educational pursuits.228 
Social science research shows that tracking as an educational practice 
fails to substantially meet all three objectives and thus deprives 
students of a minimally adequate education. 
Many studies have focused on the efficacy of tracking and its 
impacts on students in different course levels and ability groups. Some 
studies focus on individual schools or a small set of schools, while 
others synthesize data through meta-analysis (studies that look at a 
mass of other results from other studies). Investigations focused on 
one school are not always persuasive because they do not always 
provide a satisfying range for comparison, but large reviews of 
tracking systems sometimes gloss over the complicated contexts of 
individual schools, their backgrounds, and operations. However, 
findings from both types of studies are valuable for their narrative and 
empirical data and provide different facets of tracking’s outcomes. 
 
 225.  Id. at 414. 
 226.  See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212 (articulating Kentucky’s standards). 
 227.  See id. 
 228.  Id. 
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A. Low Track Classes Fail to Equip Students with a Sufficient Base of 
Skills and Knowledge 
Defining a minimum base of skills and knowledge may seem like 
another difficult standard to articulate, but the Supreme Court and 
lower courts have generally been consistent in pronouncing that 
education should prepare students to meaningfully engage in the 
democratic system and succeed in college or career.229 Requiring that 
schools train and educate students with a minimum base of skills and 
knowledge to participate in democracy and the job market should 
thus be a part of the standard. The Partnership for 21st Century 
Learning (P21), a national advocacy organization that has been 
influential in outlining important skills that today’s students should 
acquire,230 could provide substantive guidelines for this minimum 
base. In their Framework for 21st Century Learning, P21 has focused 
on different areas of literacies in addition to skills such as creativity 
and innovation, critical thinking and problem solving, communication, 
and collaboration.231 
Litigants that challenge tracking systems under a state substantive 
due process claim will likely have to show that tracked classes fail to 
equip students with a sufficient base of skills and knowledge.232 
Students in lower-tracked classes will be more likely to bring a claim 
and thus will argue that their class structure and curriculum fails to 
provide them with a minimum set of skills and basic knowledge. 
Plaintiffs will have to point to specific deficiencies in their individual 
 
 229.  See id. (articulating Kentucky standards that emphasize preparation for academic and 
vocational training); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221–22 (1982) (recognizing “the public school 
as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of democratic system of government” and 
that “some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and 
intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence”); 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978) (quoting the 
Washington Constitution when it said that the purpose of education is to “fit them for 
usefulness in the future”). 
 230.  Partnership for 21st Century Learning, NAT’L EDUCATORS ASS’N REFERENCE CTR., 
http://www.nea.org/home/34888.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2017). 
 231.  Framework for 21st Century Learning, P’SHIP FOR 21ST CENTURY LEARNING, 
http://www.p21.org/storage/documents/docs/P21_framework_0816.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 
2017). Under Key Subjects and 21st Century Themes, P21 promotes global awareness, financial, 
economic, business and entrepreneurial literacy, civic literacy, health literacy, and 
environmental literacy. Id. P21 also advocates for a set of information, media, and technology 
skills as well as life and career skills (flexibility and adaptability; initiative and self-direction; 
social and cross-cultural skills; productivity and accountability; leadership and responsibility). 
Id. 
 232.  See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 222 (articulating Kentucky’s standards, which describe some 
minimum base of skills and knowledge). 
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school systems to succeed in their claims and thus much of their 
arguments will be contextual. Plaintiffs could also focus on what 
external social science research has proven about tracking’s 
effectiveness. 
Lower-tracked classes often fail to provide students with the 
opportunity to develop the minimum skills and knowledge base to 
engage effectively in democratic institutions. This evidence is shown 
most prominently through qualitative evidence rather than 
quantitative evidence, as shown in Jeannie Oakes’s book, Keeping 
Track; her seminal research involved studying 25 secondary schools 
and their tracking systems from very different communities.233 Part of 
her research incorporated interviewing students, parents, teachers, and 
administrators.234 Ultimately, Oakes found that students in lower 
tracks and higher tracks “had markedly different access to knowledge 
and learning experiences[.]”235 
When she asked teachers what they hoped students would learn 
from their classes, teachers gave responses that generally fell into two 
categories: “independence” and “conformity.”236 In the 
“independence” category, teachers generally expressed a desire to 
teach their students critical thinking, the ability to work on individual 
projects/assignments, self-direction, and creativity.237 In the 
“conformity” category, teachers communicated a desire to teach their 
students merely to behave in class and complete simple tasks.238 
Oakes found that higher-tracked classes were more likely to 
emphasize the skills under “independence,” while lower-tracked 
classes emphasized the “conformity” skills.239 Furthermore, when 
students were asked what was the most important thing they learned 
or done in class so far, student responses mirrored the same trend.240 
Skills in the independence category constitute important skills 
 
 233.  OAKES, supra note 2, at 41. 
 234.  Id. at 42. 
 235.  Id. at 74. 
 236.  Id. at 84. 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  Id. at 82–85. Oakes found that teachers focused on compliant behaviors such as how to 
get along with others, work quietly, improve study habits, cooperate, and conform to rules and 
expectations. Id. at 84–85. 
 239.  Id. at 85. 
 240.  See id. at 67–72. Students in higher tracked classes primarily focused on learning how 
to think critically and independently, prepare for college, and apply what they have learned to 
understand current and future events. Id. at 67–70. Students in lower tracked classes primarily 
focused on skills related to job applications and skills, and many of them even wrote “nothing” 
or “I don’t remember.” Id. 70–72. 
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required for effective participation in today’s democratic and social 
institutions. Plaintiffs may be able to show the same discrepancy 
exhibited in this study in their schools. 
Furthermore, lower-tracked classes are often taught by less 
qualified teachers in low-track classes.241 Low-tracked classes are 
usually not desirable assignments, and veteran teachers may be able 
to secure the more preferable high tracked classes.242 As a result, 
studies show that teachers in low tracks tend to have less teaching 
experience, fewer degrees, and less certifications in the subject area 
they were assigned to teach.243 Although more experience does not 
always make one teacher superior to another, studies have 
consistently shown that experienced teachers continue to increase 
their effectiveness in improving student outcomes over time.244 One 
study showed that greater teacher experience correlates with lower 
rates of student absenteeism.245 Ultimately, higher rates of student 
attendance is an important element in helping students acquire more 
skills and knowledge by the simple fact that they are present in class. 
Low tracks may also deprive students of a minimum base of 
knowledge and skills in ways that are unrelated to curriculum. 
Oakes’s study shows that students in high tracks reported more 
positive relationships with their teachers than students in low tracks.246 
Positive student-teacher relationships produce better academic 
outcomes because these interactions motivate students to engage 
more fully in the classroom environment.247 Additionally, students in 
low tracks indicated that their classes were characterized by “yelling,” 
“fighting,” and “arguing,” while students in high tracks never 
mentioned these words and were more likely to use “warm, helpful 
feelings” to characterize their classes.248 Negative classroom 
interactions in lower tracks may detract from a safe learning 
 
 241.  Id. at 227. See also Adam Gamoran, Alternative Uses of Ability Grouping in Secondary 
Schools, 102 AM. J. EDUC. 1, 5 (1993). Other studies have also reported the same finding. Id. 
 242.  OAKES, supra note 2, at 227. 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Helen Ladd & Lucy Sorensen, Returns to Teacher Experience: Student Achievement 
and Motivation in Middle School, 1–2, 22–23, 30 (National Center for Analysis of Longitudinal 
Data in Educational Research, Working Paper No. 112, Dec. 2015). 
 245.  Id. at 4, 27–30. 
 246.  OAKES, supra note 2, at 124–26. Students in high-track classes were more likely to 
perceive their teachers as caring about them than those in low-track classes. Id. 
 247.  Diana Raufelder, Sandra Scherber, & Megan Wood, The Interplay Between 
Adolescents’ Perceptions of Teacher Relationships and their Academic Self-Regulation, 53 
PSYCHOL. SCHS. 736, 737 (2016). 
 248.  OAKES, supra note 2, at 125. 
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environment and prevent students from taking on academic 
challenges and acquiring a sufficient base of knowledge and skills. 
B. Low-Track Classes Fail to Prepare Students for Future 
Employment and Higher Educational Pursuits 
Litigants must also show that low-track classes do not prepare 
students for future job and higher educational opportunities. 
Although plaintiffs may have data on their specific school’s outcomes, 
they should also be able to point to general social science research to 
support their claim that tracking fails to provide students in the lower 
tracks with a minimally adequate education to succeed in college and 
careers. 
It is easier to show that low-track classes do not adequately 
prepare students for college. Being placed in a low-track can have 
profound impacts on long term educational and post-graduate 
outcomes. For example, one study showed that being placed in a high- 
or low-track high school course could dramatically impact future 
enrollment in higher-level classes.249 Students who scored in the fifth 
decile on eighth grade tests and took biology in ninth grade had a 
71% chance of later taking physics or chemistry.250 Conversely, 
students who scored at the same percentile and took a low-level 
science class in ninth grade only had a 7% chance of later taking 
advanced science courses.251 Students placed in low-tracks often have 
“lower aspirations” and higher dropout rates than higher-tracked 
students.252 Although sociological factors also play a significant role in 
creating these discrepancies, tracking inhibits a student’s potential to 
achieve academically. 
The very nature of tracked classes is that there are very different 
expectations for students in different tracks based on perceived 
abilities. These distinct expectations create different kinds of work 
and demands in the classrooms. One study followed sixteen secondary 
schools and found that teachers were more likely to emphasize 
higher-order thinking and problem solving in high-tracks than in low-
tracks.253 Whereas high tracked students are pushed to engage in 
 
 249.  WELNER, supra note 25, at 10. 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  Id. 
 252.  Losen, supra note 30, at 522. 
 253.  See WELNER, supra note 25, at 11 (describing a study performed by Raudenbush, 
Rowan, and Cheong in 1993). 
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critical thinking, problem solving, and other higher-order skills that 
involve projects and complex texts, low-tracked students are often 
drudging away on basic literacy tasks and worksheets.254 The tracking 
systems often sends a very clear message to students in low track 
classes that they are unfit to pursue a college degree, especially when 
the track is more strongly linked with vocational programming.255 
Showing that the tracked school system fails to provide students 
with a minimally adequate education can be more difficult if the 
school has a strong vocational program. Ultimately, vocational 
programs vary in the range of opportunities and some provide 
excellent training while others are more deficient.256 However, racial 
and socioeconomic stratification still exists within vocational 
programs, where nonwhite students are often more concentrated in 
areas where the trade requires lower skill and white students are more 
concentrated in more lucrative trades.257 If schools are supposed to 
truly train students to work in the 21st Century, the standard for a 
minimally adequate education should correlate with training in more 
modern and profitable fields. Public schools need to ensure that 
students have equitable opportunities to choose programs in more 
lucrative fields. 
C. Tracking Fails to Enable Students to Compete Favorably with 
Student Counterparts 
Finally, litigants must show that the tracking system fails to 
provide students with a basic education that allows them to compete 
with their peers locally or in “surrounding states.” This may require 
more state-specific research, but an argument about how students in 
low tracks fail to compete with their student counterparts in the same 
school or other schools without tracking should also be persuasive. 
 
 254.  See Gamoran, supra note 241, at 6 (describing a study where low track classes where 
“knowledge was defined by daily work sheets” because teachers had low expectations for 
students’ academic progress.); OAKES, supra note 2, at 76–77, 88–89 (detailing observations and 
student responses regarding what low track classes focused on in terms of skills and activities). 
 255.  OAKES, supra note 2, at 75, 170; Beth Rubin, Detracking in Context: How Local 
Constructions of Ability Complicate Equity-Geared Reform, 110 TCHRS. C. REC. 646, 689 (2008). 
 256.  OAKES, supra note 2, at 164. 
 257.  Id. at 166–67. Programs with greater populations of nonwhite students focused more 
heavily on trades for low-level occupations such as clerical skills and manual labor. See id. 
Programs at schools with greater populations of white students offered a wider range of skills 
including those above and also “managerial and financial aspects of the business world,” marine 
technology, aviation, food preparation, and general woodworking. Id. 
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Students in low-track classes fail to compete with students in high-
track classes. Evidence shows that tracking systems have a 
disproportionate impact on academic gains: students in low tracks will 
make much less academic progress in grades and test scores 
throughout the year than those in high tracks.258 Additionally, research 
shows that the achievement gaps between students in tracked classes 
grow steadily over time.259 Professor Robert Slavin, a prominent 
scholar in tracking, has conducted numerous studies that compared 
student achievement in tracked and untracked settings. When Slavin 
synthesized data from twenty-nine studies on tracking in secondary 
schools,260 he found that students in higher tracks make more 
academic gains in mathematics than students in lower tracks.261 Oakes 
found in her research following twenty-five schools that students in 
lower tracks made smaller gains (and even losses) in standardized 
achievement tests than their counterparts in higher tracks over the 
course of a year.262 Large discrepancies in learning gains grow wider 
over time and magnify differences between the students in high and 
low tracks, often along lines of race and socioeconomic status. These 
gaps make it impossible for students to leave those tracks and catch 
up with their peers. 
Tracking also reinforces the idea that students in low tracks cannot 
compete with students in high tracks. Tracking’s exacerbation of 
sociological and psychological pressures is well documented by social 
science research. For example, Karolyn Tyson wrote a highly 
 
 258.  See OAKES, supra note 2, at 236–39 (finding that high-track placement led to 
achievement gains while low track placement consistently demonstrated lesser achievement 
gains and describing other students that show similar evidence); Karl L. Alexander, Martha 
Cook, & Edward L. McDill, Curriculum Tracking and Educational Stratification: Some Further 
Evidence, 43 AM. SOC. REV. 47, 57 (1978) (finding that students placed in college bound tracks 
made much higher gains on the Sequential Test of Educational Progress (STEP) throughout 11th 
grade than those in low tracks); Yehzkel Dar & Nura Resh, Classroom Intellectual Composition 
and Academic Achievement, 23 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 357, 369–70 (1986) (finding that students in 
low-resource homogenous classes make less educational gains that those in high resource 
homogenous classes); Adam Gamoran & Robert D. Mare, Secondary School Tracking and 
Educational Inequality: Compensation, Reinforcement, or Neutrality?, 94 AM. J. SOC. 1146, 
1171–73, 1176–78 (1989) (finding that “average rates of both achievement and graduation would 
be higher if all students enrolled in the college track” and also describing a study that found that 
high track student achieve more and low track students achieve less than students in untracked 
schools). 
 259.  OAKES, supra note 2, at 236. 
 260.  Slavin, supra note 49, at 484. These results primarily focus on students and classes in 
seventh through ninth grades. Id. 
 261.  Id. at 487–88. These studies controlled for IQ, socioeconomic status, pretests, and 
other measures. Id. 
 262.  OAKES, supra note 2, at 236. 
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recognized book that documents how tracking shapes black students’ 
self-perceptions, school life, and academic performance.263 She begins 
her book by explaining that “the image of overwhelmingly black 
lower-level classes and overwhelmingly white advanced classes[] 
sends a powerful message to students about ability, race, status, and 
achievement.”264 Especially as adolescents try to figure out their 
academic and social fit, a school’s academic sorting practices can 
reinforce racial patterns and stereotypes.265 An adolescent’s success or 
failure at school is pivotal: studies show that students base much of 
their formulation about their identity, abilities, and potential on their 
academic performance in school.266 Thus, in tracked schools that are 
also racially divided, these segregated structures sustain “the myth of 
black inferiority” when black students have to face that reality every 
day.267 Furthermore, students in lower tracks report much more 
negative views of themselves than students in higher tracks.268 This 
self-fulfilling prophecy prevents students from recognizing their full 
potential and performing comparatively with their peers. 
Finally, students in low-track classes are not able to compete with 
students who attend schools without tracking. Tracked courses do not 
improve a student’s educational performance unless the higher-
tracked class utilizes a much richer curriculum. A consistent body of 
literature supports the finding that tracking itself as an educational 
strategy has little impact on overall student achievement in 
standardized test scores and grades.269 A fairly recent meta-analysis of 
500 studies concluded that tracking had “minimal effects on learning 
outcomes.”270 Slavin found that high-achieving students perform 
equally well in tracked and untracked classes and do not benefit from 
 
 263.  See TYSON, supra note 28, at 8. 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  Id. 
 266.  Id. at 21. 
 267.  Id. at 34. 
 268.  OAKES, supra note 2, at 143. 
 269.  See Walter R. Borg, Ability Grouping in the Public Schools, 34 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
EDUC. 1, 36 (1965) (finding no significant difference between the proportions of overachievers, 
underachievers, and normal achievers in tracked and untracked systems); James A. Kulik & 
Chen-Lin Kulik, Effects of Ability Grouping on Secondary School Students: A Meta-Analysis of 
Evaluation Findings, 19 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 415, 420–23 (1982) (finding only a slight 
improvement of examination performance in grouped classes than ungrouped classes); Slavin, 
supra note 49, at 473 (finding that the effects of ability grouping on student achievement are 
essentially zero). 
 270.  JOHN HATTIE, VISIBLE LEARNING: A SYNTHESIS OF OVER 800 META-ANALYSES 
RELATING TO ACHIEVEMENT 90 (1st ed. 2008). 
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separate classes unless the high-track program exposes the high 
achievers to material typically taught at a higher grade.271 There is 
even “little empirical evidence” that gifted-education programs 
provide academic benefits.272 Another study shows that students in 
high tracks only benefit when the course incorporates an enriched 
curriculum very different from the low-track curriculum.273 Untracked 
classes with the same rich curriculum and learning opportunities can 
provide much greater gains than simply separating students by ability. 
Students in untracked classes perform better than they do in 
tracked classes. For example, one study described the effects of a 
heterogeneously grouped mathematics program with an accelerated 
curriculum on academic achievement.274 After the school detracked, 
the percentage of minority students who met the mathematics 
mastery requirement tripled from 23% to 75%.275 Additionally, the 
detracking movement in Rockville Centre School District has also 
produced significant results in improving academic outcomes.276 The 
school abandoned the track system and required all students to study 
an accelerated math curriculum in heterogeneous groups.277 
Previously, only 23% of African American or Hispanic students had 
passed state algebra standardized tests before entering high school, 
but after placing students in heterogeneously grouped classes, this 
percentage of students also tripled to 75%.278 As the school district 
continued to detrack classes in high school, 82% of all African 
American or Hispanic students graduated with a Regents diploma (a 
particular level of New York diploma), whereas only 23% of students 
within this demographic attained this diploma before in tracked 
classes.279 Detracking boosts academic achievement, but keeping 
students in tracked classes prevents them from performing 
academically at a higher level and competing with peers in untracked 
schools. 
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CONCLUSION 
Children and parents in diverse, racially segregated schools should 
be able to challenge tracking systems and fight for a system that 
delivers greater educational opportunities for all. Tracking is an 
ineffective and inequitable educational practice, especially in schools 
where students have incredibly diverse racial and socioeconomic 
backgrounds. While litigants may not be able to rely on the Federal 
Equal Protection or Substantive Due Process clauses to overturn 
tracking, they may be more successful contesting the system with a 
state substantive due process claim on the basis that low-tracked 
classes deny students a minimally adequate education. Furthermore, 
there may come a time when the Supreme Court and federal courts 
recognize a fundamental right to a minimally adequate education and 
provide a basis for relief through federal substantive due process. 
But overturning tracking in the courtroom is only the first battle; 
schools will have to use the expertise of their teachers and 
administrators to differentiate their instruction so that untracked 
classrooms truly work for all students. Schools will need more 
resources to retrain teachers, and teacher education programs must 
also develop teachers capable of working in untracked classrooms. 
This will not happen without the muscle of the courts or legislative 
bodies recognizing the right to a minimally adequate education and 
mandating that schools work towards fulfilling their obligations to the 
students. Until all schools prioritize equitable educational 
opportunities for all, students and parents may need to rely on the 
courts to take the first steps to eliminate discriminatory tracking. 
 
